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Abstract 
This paper analyzes developments in general government expenditures and revenues 
for 26 reforming ex-socialist economies (RESEs) over the period 1989-1994. The data 
indicate that, rather than uniformly converging to a “Western European” norm, RESEs have 
followed a variety of patterns, depending on how successful they have been in economic 
reform in general and in tackling the increase in the demand for social protection in 
particular. The paper conducts an empirical investigation of spending patterns and the 
sustainability of revenues required to maintain current government spending, and concludes 
that there are strong indications that the fiscal accounts will remain under pressure in a 
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Introduction 
The economic transformation in reforming ex-socialist economies (RESEs) in Central 
and Eastern Europe and the FSU has profoundly affected public finances. As noted by many, 
solving the public finances crisis associated with the onset of economic transformation has 
been one of the main tasks that have confronted policy makers. A close association between 
success in public sector deficit containment and success in economic liberalization has also 
been noted (de Melo, Denizer, and Gelb, 1995). 
Yet some observes are beginning to argue that, after 4-5 years of economic reforms, the 
fiscal systems of the RESEs may have converged to the advanced-European norm, 
characterized by high spending ratios, mature social welfare systems, and consequently high 
taxation. Worries are openly expressed as to the effects on long-term growth of such high 
spending and tax ratios. 
This paper addresses two questions. First, whether the data support the “convergence” 
hypothesis. Second, whether, based on international experience, there are indications 
regarding the direction and sustainability of existing and prospective expenditure and revenue 
patterns. In the first section of the paper, we review the evidence on the behavior of general 
government spending in the 26 transition countries under consideration. In the empirical 
analysis of the second section, we seek to identify major determinants of government 
expenditures and to assess the adequacy and dynamics of the current levels of spending in the 
transition countries.  
We find that although the data show that several countries are indeed high spenders, 
there is substantial variation. We identify some of the ways in which policy choices and initial 
conditions have interacted in individual economies during the transformation period. Our 
empirical analysis draws upon the standard tests of the Wagner's Hypothesis of the positive 
correlation between government expenditure and a country's level of economic development 
(Ram, 1987, Pryor, 1968 and Musgrave, 1969), but further develops the specification of the 
factors underlying public spending ratios.  Rather than national income (per-capita GDP) as an 
explanatory variable, it emphasizes “structural” and collective choice features, which seem to 
play a crucial role during transition. L. Barbone, H. Polackova 
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In the third section, we tackle the problem of assessing the future ability of transition 
governments to finance their expenditure trends. We provide some econometric evidence 
regarding the determinants and the sustainability of revenue collection required to this 
purpose. The econometric analysis is patterned on the classic “revenue capacity” and “tax 
effort” approaches (Lotz and Morss, 1967 and Tanzi, 1992), again, including other, specific 
factors that provide a degree of freedom for social preferences. 
Conclusions, of a sobering nature, follow. 
 
1.  The Size of the State:  A Convergence? 
Any study of government expenditure patterns in the reforming former socialist 
economies (RESEs) must suffer from important definition and data availability problems. 
Most countries (in the FSU and in the former Yugoslavia, as well as the Czech and Slovak 
republics) did not exist as sovereign units only five years ago, and even for those that kept, for 
one reason or the other, some form of fiscal accounting, intertemporal comparisons are 
complicated by the need to control for functions that previously might have been carried out 
by a federal government authority. Perhaps even more important, at least for a number of 
RESEs, is the fact that the budget was a very incomplete measure of the public spending, 
which was greatly incremented by lending from the banking system as well as by off-budget 
expenditures and guarantees. 
These caveats suggest that whatever international comparisons are made and trends 
detected, they should be taken with great care. Generally speaking, broad trends, and their 
driving forces, rather than a precise quantification should be sought. 
This being said, there is little doubt that, at the start of transition, the countries of Eastern 
Europe and FSU recorded large government expenditure on both economic and non-economic 
sectors - on subsidies and transfers, on education and health care. These expenditure 
categories, as shares of GDP, matched or surpassed the amounts spent in Western Europe. In 
1988-89, recorded consolidated general government expenditures (or some equivalent 
approximation) averaged some 53 per cent of GDP, ranging from a high of 67 for Mongolia to Public Finances and Economic Transition 
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40 per cent of GDP for Romania and the former Yugoslavia. This compares with an average 
OECD expenditure of 51 per cent of GDP (55 per cent for the West European countries).
1 
As it is well known, there have been multiple reasons for these high expenditure ratios. 
On average, some 15 per cent of GDP was devoted to subsidies to enterprises and 
households, ranging from the high of 20 per cent for Czechoslovakia to moderate 4 per cent 
for Yugoslavia.
2 The high subsidy ratios went hand-in glove with high revenue ratios, as a 
result of the duplications created by the distorted set of relative prices typical of socialist 
economies (Barbone and Marchetti, 1995). This engendered high profitability, and therefore 
high profit taxes, for a number of “favored” sectors, which was however counterbalanced by 
large losses in some sectors and the required subsidies from the budget. With the advent of 
economic liberalization and of market-based pricing, much of this “duplication” has 
disappeared, and with that both sides of the government budget's income and loss statement 
have been scaled down. 
Prior to transition, most of the socialist countries had already developed a social safety 
net system, generally comprising a pay-as-you-go pension scheme, sick pay, generous 
maternity benefits and family allowances, retraining/labor funds, as well as specific welfare 
schemes. Social security transfers usually absorbed some 25 per cent of total expenditure. 
These did not include any unemployment benefits as unemployment, with the exception of 
Yugoslavia, was by definition non-existent. Similarly to the West European countries, 
however, large transfers were assigned to the provision of pensions.
3 Government 
expenditure on pensions ranged from about 6 per cent of GDP in the FSU, where pensions 
                                                 
1  It should be noted that in 1993/94, the highest OECD spender Sweden, at 72 per cent of GDP, far 
surpassed the most profligate RESEs. In 1988-89, Sweden's general government expenditure accounted for about 62 
per cent of GDP, but rose by 10 per cent of GDP thereafter. 
2  In addition to enterprise subsidies, government also carried cost of settling inter-enterprise arrears and non-
repaid loan from the state-owned banks.  The financial burden of this soft budget was quite heavy also on the 
government of Yugoslavia (Corricelli and Rocha, 1991).  Also invisible in the budget figures, there used to be some 
implicit subsidies financed by tax offsets and negative real interest. 
3   The proportion of social transfers in the government budget was lower than in many OECD countries on 
account of the fact that many social functions were performed by the state enterprise system.  For example, in the 
former Soviet Union, a large amount of goods and services, including day care, was provided through the social 
consumption funds of the SOEs.  SOEs were also in charge of allocating the social security benefits as well as of 
collecting tax and social security contributions.  Thus, most of the transition countries had developed neither strong 
social security administration nor historical records of individual contributions and benefits.  Later, creation of new 
sovereign states required building of their public administration systems from virtually a zero base. L. Barbone, H. Polackova 
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were conditioned by previous employment, to more than 9 per cent of GDP in Hungary, 
providing a universal pension coverage. Historically, the social benefits paid were not 
related to the social security contributions, and general revenues provided major source of 
financing the entire social security system. 
Capital formation was also generally higher than in OECD countries, although often 
government expenditure data may have reflected fuzzy accounting procedures in the 
statistics of many RESEs. In Albania, for instance, all recorded investment was carried out 
by state enterprises, and took the form of central allocations to enterprises for investment 
purposes. Indeed, in keeping with the pure central planning model, enterprises were not 
allowed to retain any of their surplus, and could not, therefore invest on their own. A similar 
practice obtained in Romania and FSU. This had the effect of showing the entire domestic 
investment as a budgetary expenditure item, something that is not consistent with GFS 
practices with regard to general government reporting. 
Finally, in a number of countries (particularly the FSU) large military expenditures 
contributed to overall high spending levels. For instance, it was estimated that at the end of 




1.1. Transition and Government Spending 
Spending ratios have changed drastically in a number of countries following the onset 
of economic liberalization (Figure 1). Between 1988/89 and 1993/94, the average general 
government expenditure declined from 53 to 39 per cent of GDP. Out of our sample of 26 
transition countries, 18 countries decreased their total expenditure ratios. The reduction has 
been limited in some (for example, in Russia or Uzbekistan it was about 3 per cent of GDP), 
but very drastic in others, such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, where the size of 
government expenditure has shrunk by more than 30 per cent of GDP (and where, as we 
will discuss later, the decline in expenditure was accompanied by swelling government 
                                                 
4  These figures are disputed, as alternative estimates put military expenditures to as high as 20 per cent of GDP. 
 See IMF, World Bank and OECD, 1991. Public Finances and Economic Transition 
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arrears in pensions and other assigned benefits). On the other hand, 8 countries expanded 
their governments.  In 1993-94, for instance, government expenditure in Macedonia and 
Slovenia surpassed the 1988 average of the former Yugoslav government by more than 7 
and 9 per cent of GDP, respectively. 
Figure 1: 
 


























Notes: 1.  Within each group countries are sorted according to their level of government 
expenditure in 1993-94. 
  2.   The figures for 1988-89 assign to currently existing  countries the averages of the 
their former federal states.  
 
1.2. A Typology of Changing Expenditures 
There are multiple reasons for the changing patterns, reflecting just as much successful 
reforms in the economic role of governments as well lack of restructuring in its social-
security responsibilities, or, simply, a drastic fall in government revenues.  While we are 
aware of all the risks associated with sweeping generalizations, we offer a four-fold L. Barbone, H. Polackova 
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classification of the typology of changes in public expenditure in RESEs, based on an 
assessment of their reforming of major spending programs, particularly those that proxy the 
level of government economic interventionism and the role of government in social and 
welfare sectors.  
Table 1: Classification of RESEs by Spending Patterns and the Average General 
Government Expenditure and Revenue, 1993-94. 




























Avg. gg Expenditure  50.1 % of GDP  47.9 % of GDP  33.3 % of GDP  23.1 % of GDP 
Avg. gg Revenue  31.8 % of GDP  42.5 % of GDP  30.2 % of GDP  19.3 % of GDP 
 
The first two groups include countries where changes in government expenditures may 
have been led mainly by social demand, albeit with sharply differing characteristics. The 
range of the countries in which social demand has proven to be the main determinant of 
government expenditure is broad and goes from those perceived as the leaders of transition 
(e.g., Hungary and Poland), to countries that became a common target of criticism for lack 
of reforms (e.g., Uzbekistan and Ukraine).   
What all these countries have in common is that their governments, so far, have 
remained the major, if not the sole, entity responsible to accommodate the demand for social 
protection. They have inherited many of the social welfare functions that had previously 
been confined to the state enterprise sector, but have been unable to significantly promote 
involvement of the private sector in these areas. As a result, the size of the state in all these Public Finances and Economic Transition 
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countries remains high. With per-capita income near to the middle-income developing 
countries, these transition countries would thus seem outliers in the traditional positive 
correlation between the per capita GDP and the GDP share of government expenditure (e.g., 
Krumm, Milanovic, and Walton, 1994). In the next section, we will review this issue. Then, 
we will show that, particularly for countries with the lowest per capita incomes, such as 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, or Tajikistan, legitimate doubts can be raised about 
their ability to collect a sufficient amount of tax revenues to sustain the large government 
programs. 
Group 1 includes countries, which, so far, have had the worst of possible worlds. They 
have timidly initiated economic reform, and therefore stimulated the demand for social 
protection. But, at the same time, they have been most reluctant in reducing the intervention 
of the state in the economy and the required subsidization of enterprises. Slow in 
privatization, maintaining many loss-making enterprises afloat, and allowing for large over-
employment, governments effectively hamper development of a market environment in the 
enterprise as well as social sectors.
5 For example, enterprise subsidies in Belarus and 
Ukraine amount to, respectively 6 and 9 per cent of GDP. In Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan enterprise subsidies have been about four per cent of GDP, but 
complemented by large net lending of and arrears to the government. In its fiscal effect, this 
reform “sequencing” brought about large deficits, reaching on average almost 20 per cent of 
GDP. 
  The second group of countries (Group 2) has been considerably bolder in reducing 
price distortions and the related need for subsidies from the government. At the same time, 
however, the emergence of a hard budget constraint on enterprises, the advances in 
privatization and restructuring in the enterprise and financial sectors, combined with 
inaction or explicit policy choice to result in a substantial increase in cash benefit outlays. 
These increases have more than compensated, in most cases, for the reduction in enterprise 
subsidies. In this group, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, 
                                                 
5  To differentiate the countries of the first group according to the remaining economic interventionism of their 
government, we consider the extent of cuts in enterprise subsidies, non-repaid tax- and enterprise arrears, government 
net lending, and the existing support to privatization and private sector development.  See de Melo, Denizer, Gelb 
(1995). L. Barbone, H. Polackova 
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Mongolia, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Slovenia, all experienced the budget cost of rising 
unemployment and retirement, or of consolidation of old enterprise arrears and bank 
recapitalization. Whereas the latter is a temporary expenditure only, the former may remain 
on high levels if government does not progress with a comprehensive reform of social 
security system. Indeed, economic growth, which resumed in most of the countries of the 
second group, has not brought about any decline in government social security and welfare 
expenditure. Governments have undertaken only very cautious steps in developing new, 
private, social security and welfare schemes, and in redirecting the social demand to the 
private sector. Similarly to the first group, the expenditure patterns of these countries have 
converged to the West European levels, while the income gap remains wide. But, much 
more than in the countries of the first group, economic liberalization in these countries 
allowed for some government savings. After hard budget constraint was introduced to 
enterprises and banks, governments cut enterprise and credit subsidies significantly. As 
discussed, in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, enterprise subsidies have 
dropped by not less than ten per cent of GDP. 
Other transition countries (group 3 and 4) had no choice to permit large increases in 
social security expenditure and, due to revenue collapses, had to reduce the size of 
government spending altogether. Initially, public expenditures in all these countries were 
shocked by a tight financial constraint. Governments have had only a very limited, or 
virtually none, access to credit, and collapse of revenues has required to switch to cash 
rationing and drastically restrain expenditure. We differentiate among these countries, 
again, according to their reform efforts. 
Group 3 includes countries, which have not only resisted the temptation to provide 
generous social security and welfare benefits, but also forcefully moved towards new, fully 
funded, pension schemes, enhanced their social security administration, and reduced the 
scope of abuse of welfare benefits. In Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Romania, 
government has significantly liberalized the economy, almost eliminated enterprise 
subsidies, and reduced its responsibilities in the social sector. Although net lending figures 
may suggest that many enterprises in the Baltics have not become subject to the hard budget 
constraint entirely, the recent progress on the front of privatization may address this issue.  
Compared to the countries in the previous two groups, it is possible to suggest that, here, Public Finances and Economic Transition 
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government reform priorities, rather than social demand, took the lead in determining the 
expenditure dynamics. On the other hand, cuts undertaken by these governments in health 
care, or public investment, or (with the exception of Latvia) also in education, have not been 
fully counterbalanced by new services in the private sector. Thus, when tax revenues permit, 
governments might find themselves under pressure to pay for some of the current gaps. 
Nevertheless, as we discuss in the next section, expenditure levels in these countries appear 
at, or under, the values predicted by structural models of government expenditures, 
suggesting that they might be converging to the spending ratios of middle-income rather 
than West European countries. 
With little progress in either economic liberalization or social expenditure reforms, the 
governments of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Turkmenistan (Group 4), resemble 
their counterparts in group 1, except for the drastically lower levels of general government 
expenditures. But closer examination reveals that the large drop in their public expenditure, 
so far, has been driven by the financial constraint only. With the exception of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, enterprise subsidies still account for a relatively high proportion of the 
government budget and the reduction in social expenditure may well be transitory - for as 
long as it is virtually impossible for the government to collect more revenues and/or access 
credit. Since the government has been facing increasing arrears in pensions, and under-
spending on investment and maintenance, while allowing a very little room to private sector 
development, government spending may be bound to rise there as soon as recourses become 
available.
6 Thus, it is not clear whether social demand or new reform priorities will take the 
lead in determining the future government spending. When they finally emerge from 
recession, these countries might face the trap of falling back into their "traditional" high 
spending ratios. Compared to the first two groups of countries, however, here the pressure 
on the governments to privatize and contract-out social services is much greater, and, 
paradoxically, may be to these countries' long-term advantage. 
                                                 
6 The drop in and shortage of tax revenues, more drastic here than in the other countries, are also due to the lack 
of economic reforms.  And, as the state is running out of breath with financing of its economic interventions, there may 
be an increasing hope for the government permission to economic liberalization.   L. Barbone, H. Polackova 
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Group 1      
Armenia  57.8 5.9 5.7 4.6 6.9 4.9 1.2 
Tajikistan  54.2 2.3 8.8 4.9 8.9 3.2 1.1 
Ukraine  52.1 0.2 4.8 4.2 8.2 9.0 0.8 
Uzbekistan 49.0  -2.9 9.8 4.8  10.3 3.1 1.2 
Azerbaijan 46.1  -5.8 7.9 2.9 8.1 4.2 0.7 
Georgia  46.0  -5.9 4.7 2.6 9.8 3.4 0.9 
Belarus  45.2  -6.7 5.1 4.9 7.3 6.5 1.1 
avg.  50.0  -1.8 6.7 4.1 8.5 4.9 1.0 
Group 2         
Hungary  61.6 0.7 6.0 6.8 9.9 4.4 3.0 
Slovakia  54.6  -9.9 6.0 5.6 9.7 4.9 3.5 
Czech  Rep  50.1  -14.4 5.8 7.1 8.4 3.9 3.7 
Poland  49.3 2.7 4.9 4.5  15.0 2.0 3.6 
Russia  48.1  -3.8 4.3 3.4 6.5 1.2 1.8 
Slovenia  47.0 9.7 5.3 7.4  13.3 3.6 3.2 
Macedonia 45.0 7.7 4.9 6.9  10.4 1.3 2.9 
Bulgaria  44.6  -16.8 4.9 4.8  10.2 1.6 1.4 
Mongolia  43.1  -23.7 7.6 4.4 8.0 3.9 2.6 
Albania  42.2  -19.8 3.4 2.9 7.9 0.9 1.4 
Croatia  40.9 3.6 2.9 8.1 9.1 2.1 3.3 
avg.  47.9  -5.8 5.1 5.6 9.9 2.7 2.8 
Group 3         
Estonia  38.4  -13.5 6.5 4.3 6.7 1.0 2.3 
Latvia  37.0  -14.9 6.3 4.1 9.6 0.2 1.7 
Romania  33.1  -6.6 3.4 3.0 8.6 3.2 1.6 
Lithuania  31.3  -20.6 3.9 3.2 4.6 1.3 2.2 
Moldova  26.5  -25.4 6.2 3.9 4.2 1.1 1.2 
avg.  33.6  -16.2 5.3 3.7 6.7 1.4 1.8 
Group 4         
Kyrgyz  Rep.  34.9  -17.0 3.4 3.3 6.1 3.4 1.9 
Kazakhstan 18.8  -33.1 3.3 2.1 0.2 3.2 1.1 
Turkmenistan  15.7  -36.2 3.9 2.1 0.9 2.1 0.6 
avg.  23.1  -28.8 3.5 2.5 2.4 2.9 1.2 
Notes:  1.  All expenditure items apply to consolidated general government accounts. 
2.  The indicator of economic reforms is up to 5, rising with  the extent of government support to economic 
liberalization and to private sector development.  For construction of the indicator, see  de Melo,  Denizer 
and Gelb (1995). Public Finances and Economic Transition 
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2.  An Empirical Assessment of Patterns of Government 
Spending in RESEs 
The data discussed in the previous section provide a “snapshot” of a fast-changing 
public spending picture in the reforming ex-socialist economies. In this and the next section, 
we want to address more directly the question of the adequacy and sustainability of the 
spending patterns that have emerged so far. More specifically, adopting a concept of 
“carrying capacity” of a fiscal burden for a given economy, we would like to assess: (i) 
whether the public-spending/GDP ratios presently observed in RESEs are in line with 
“comparable” indicators predicted from structural characteristics of advanced and less-
advanced comparators; and, (ii) perhaps more importantly, whether the fiscal burden 
implied by the spending ratios is indeed bearable for the RESEs in the long term. 
To shed light on these issues, we develop an empirical model aimed at explaining 
cross-country differences in the ratios of general government expenditure and revenues to 
GDP. The model picks up from and extends the existing empirical literature on spending 
and taxing ratios (See Lotz and Morss, 1967, and Heller and Diamond, 1990). The analysis 
is carried out using data on 73 countries, including the 26 RESEs, the OECD and a group of 
middle-income developing countries. The estimates are performed for 1993 or 1994, 
depending on data availability. 
  The purpose of the regressions is as follows. We first assess government spending 
ratios prevailing in RESEs by running a regression on non-RESE country spending patterns 
and selected structural indicators. The choice of indicators is discussed below. We then use 
the estimated parameter values to obtain theoretical spending ratios for RESEs, and 
compare them against the actual values. We use the difference between the theoretical and 
actual values as an indication of over- or under-spending, and provide comparisons based 
on the country groupings defined in the previous section. Next, we repeat the same 
procedure for government revenues. Then, we put the two sets of results together, and draw 
observations on adequacy and sustainability of expenditures. 
2.1. Determinants of Public Expenditures 
The determinants of the size of the state in modern market economies have been 
analyzed in the past and, not surprisingly, they appear complex and not easy to quantify. L. Barbone, H. Polackova 
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The literature suggests that demographic factors are important in explaining government 
expenditures. For example, the age structure and growth of the population, urbanization, 
and ethnic or religious homogeneity, affect demand for both current and capital government 
expenditure (Goffman and Mahar, 1971, and Pryor, 1968). On the other hand, supply of 
government services may badly fail to meet the needs due to a rapid demographic changes 
(Brazer, 1959).
7 
  General economic circumstances have been considered crucial since 1883, when 
Adolph Wagner suggested that, as an economy develops, the public sector (and 
consequently public spending) grows in relative importance. For example, industrialization, 
the ratio of manufacturing output to GDP, and market development tend to increase the 
amounts of government spending on education, research and development, health care and 
welfare. It is also commonly accepted that, as an economy develops, the relative importance 
of direct government provision of services, and thus the government's role as an employer 
falls, while other types of expenditure, such as transfers, become more important (Heller 
and Diamond, 1990); or that the more unequal is the distribution of income, the more police 
services may be desired (Pryor, 1968).
8 
The role of the determinants of public expenditure may change over time. For example, 
relationships between per capita GDP and government expenditure estimated from time 
series usually differ from those estimated by cross-section. Low income countries today do 
not operate under the same technical, political, and value conditions as prevailed in the past 
when now developed countries were at similar low levels of income (Musgrave, 1969).
9 
                                                 
7   The extensive analysis of Heller and Diamond (1990) showed that: (i) The relative size of the non-adult 
population (as well as the per cent of pupils reaching grade six) has a positive and statistically significant influence on 
the size of gg expenditure on education.  (ii) Surprisingly, birth and population growth rates and the size of the 
dependent population do not exercise any statistically significant influence of government health care expenditure. (iii) 
Old age dependency ratio and the proportion of labor force in manufacturing dominantly influence expenditure on 
welfare.  Since private sector takes up unemployment pay and sickness and injury benefits for the higher-income 
countries, there is not a strong relationship between welfare expenditure and pro capita GDP.  And, (iv)  urban growth 
negatively affects public health care expenditure. 
8  Analysis of expenditure data for 1950s-1960s with respect to per capita GDP for socialist and non-socialist 
countries showed that expenditure on research and development, and external security was higher in the socialist 
countries.  The "socialism dummy", however, was not significant for expenditure on education, health and welfare 
(Pryor, 1968). 
9  One of the reasons is development of new technologies.  The impact of technology on government spending 
occurs directly through, for instance, an increasing demand for road construction and complementary services, and/or 
less directly through the subsequent greater mobility of the population and the exodus from the town to the suburbs, 
with resulting heavy social capital requirements (Biehl, Roskamp, and Stolper, 1983, and Heller and Diamond, 1990). 
Similarly to the Wagner’s hypothesis, also the hypothesis about a productivity-lag (of the labor intensive public 
services) supports the relative growth of public expenditures (Baumol, 1967, and Baumol and Oates, 1975). Public Finances and Economic Transition 
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Influences on the government budget that are most difficult to assess, quantify and 
predict include social, political and administrative factors. Changes in cultural values, 
ideology and philosophy, and in the expected role of state, as well as modifications of 
political structure, alter the effective demand (distribution of votes) for public goods, and 
hence affect expenditure levels. For example, transition from authoritarian to representative 
government proves to strengthen the effective demand for social goods, as does the 
subsequent democratization of representative forms of government through the broadening 
of suffrage (Morss, Fredland and Hymans, 1967, Musgrave, 1969, and Diamond, 1977). 
Regional "traditions" influence demand for public intervention and effectiveness of public 
administration. Or, the level of social development, such as maturity of welfare system, or 
higher literacy level of the population, increases demand for public consumption 
expenditures (Pryor, 1968). Also, according to the Leviathan hypothesis, independence of 
unit for funds play an important role.  For example, education expenditures are higher in 
countries in which the main decision unit is also responsible for taxation, than in units 
where the decision unit receives tax funds from other governmental units (Brennan and 
Buchanan, 1980).
10 Then there is various anecdotal evidence, such as that creating a supply 
of bureaucrats tends to create a demand for services of bureaucrats (Bird, 1970); or that 
different climate and natural disaster occurrence require different amounts of public services 
(Pryor, 1968). 
  The last group of important government expenditure determinants involves financial 
constraints. The tax system clearly influences the size of public expenditure (Hinrichs, 
1966, Oshima, 1957, and Musgrave, 1969). Then, the built-in revenue response that exists 
due to the high income elasticity of taxation in developed countries favors public 
expenditure growth (Diamond, 1977). In addition, in many developing countries, grants and 
foreign loans shift the financial constraint on government spending, and, simultaneously 
foreign debt service, as usually, constrains spending on education and health care (Heller 
                                                 
10  Ehdaie (1994) showed that, consistent with the Leviathan model, in estimating of the government 
expenditure, the coefficient of fiscal-decentralization variable is negative.  He also stressed that fiscal decentralization 
must be considered as containing two inseparable elements of taxing and spending decisions.  Peacock and Wiseman 
(1961) noted that transferring expenditure decisions from local to central government weakens the one-to-one relation 
between benefits received and taxes paid, and thus creates a loss of control reinforced by the possibilities of 
interdepartmental logrolling. L. Barbone, H. Polackova 
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and Diamond, 1990). And anecdotal evidence suggests that supply limitation on the 
expansion of the public expenditures depends on the size of the previous year's deficit 
(Morss, Fredland and Hymans, 1967); and that expenditures rise to exhaust the revenue 
available (Parkinson, 1957). 
In sum, the literature suggests that a meaningful analysis of government expenditures 
should take into account societal factors, portraying social demand and consensus, together 
with indicators of the government ability to pursue own policy priorities and overcome 
financial constraints. Change in any of these three factors may lead to significant shifts in 
the size and composition of government expenditure. Comprehensive empirical analysis 
(Heller and Diamond, 1990, and Tait and Heller, 1982) has shown that all these three areas 
are affected by myriad exogenous factors, which are outlined above, and some of which 
may be much more significant than the level of national income per capita. This is in 
contrast to the claim that the size of the state in post-transition economies remains vastly 
“oversized”, which appear to be based on empirical evidence limited to regressions that use 
per-capita income as the explanatory variable. 
2.2. Empirical Results for the Spending Adequacy 
Based on the above discussion, we proceeded to develop an empirical model to 
explain the current spending ratios of the transition countries. We ran a series of regressions 
between general government expenditure to GDP ratios (gg) and a number of explanatory 
variables that proxy existing needs for, constraints to, social disposition toward, and the 
outcome of, government spending in the countries. We used data for 47 OECD and 
developing countries, focusing on the 1993-94 averages, to predict government spending 
ratios to transition countries.
11  Results of most significant regressions are shown in Box 1.  
In our selected regressions, the old age dependency ratio (old) serves as a proxy for 
social need of public spending
12; per capita GDP evaluated at purchasing power parity 
prices (gdp) refers to both social needs and revenue constraint of public programs; public 
debt to GDP ratio (d) directly illustrates the current and, also, the past financial constraints; 
                                                 
11 For the sample of countries and figures, used in the selected regressions see Appendix. 
12 For empirical findings of a strong relationship between the percentage of the population over 60, see (World 
Bank, 1995). Public Finances and Economic Transition 
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infant mortality (mor) and secondary education enrolment (sec) illuminate the quality of 
government services; and commonalties in historical, philosophical and political experience 
are roughly expressed by the regional dummies of Europe (eu), and Asia and Latin America 
(las).
13 We also tested many other variables, such as primary school enrolment, access to 
health care, population per physician and per hospital bed, private expenditure on health 
care, unemployment rates, gross domestic investment, or the existence of war. These, 
however, yielded a lower explanatory power than the indicators above. 
  Box 1: Expenditure Regression Summary 
All the following regressions apply to 47 countries and do not include any transition countries. 
The t-statistics is in parentheses. 
gg  =          Adj R-sqr  Root MSE
(1)      0.193 sec   + 0.131 mor +  0.396 old  + 0.455 oldeu  +  5.094     
 (2.46)  (1.96)  (1.63)  (3.98)  (0.74)  0.78  7.0 
Comparator without the regional dummies:   
      0.158 sec  + 0.153 mor  +  1.118 old    -   4.690     
 (1.75)  (1.99)  (5.98)    (-0.63) 0.71  8.1 
  Problem: Infant mortality has but should not have a positive coeficcient   
(2)     0.402 gdp  + 16.877 eu  -   9.695 las      +  31.062     
 (2.45)  (6.00)  (-4.00)    (12.72) 0.81  6.5 
Comparator without the regional dummies:   
     1.367 gdp        +  21.987     
 (6.30)        (7.78)  0.46  11.0 
(3)     0.142 sec  +   0.166 d  + 0.429 oldeu  -    8.354 las  +  21.110     
 (3.60)  (2.17)  (6.10)  (-3.67)  (5.63)  0.85  5.8 
Comparators:  
     0.154 sec  +   0.108 d  + 0.540 oldeu    +  12.690     
 (3.46)  (3.35)  (7.49)    (3.77)  0.81  6.6 
     0.065 sec  +   0.106 d    +  0.934 old    +   3.363     
 (0.93)  (2.73)  (5.13)    (0.91)  0.73  7.8 
         0.104 d  +  1.069 old    +   4.919     
   (2.67)  (9.61)    (1.50)  0.73  7.8 
Notes: sec -  secondary education enrolment ratio  gdp -  per capita GDP evaluated at PPP 
  mor - infant mortality        d - public debt to GDP ratio     
  las = 1 if country belongs to Latin America   eu = 1 if country belongs to Europe; eu = 0  
    or Asia; las = 0 otherwise         otherwise  
  old - old age dependency ratio      oldeu = old * eu 
For further expenditure analysis in this section, we use the results of regression (3). 
For its results see Figures 2 and 3.  
                                                 
13 For defining the dummies for countries of a common socio-historical experience, we tried various country 
groups, ad hoc, based on the shared political, philosophical, cultural, and religeous traditions.  Most explanatory power 
was reached by the dummy representing all European countries.  Dummies including countries of Latin America and 
Asia showed coefficients of nearly the same size and significance. L. Barbone, H. Polackova 
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Figure 2:  



























2.3. Regression Results: Patterns of Spending 
Expenditure/GDP ratios predicted on the basis of the preceding empirical analysis are 
quite revealing. First, several countries (Armenia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), particularly 
from the first group (large spenders with little success in reform), are heavily 
“overspending”. Whether secondary education enrolment, infant mortality and old age 
dependency ratio, or per capita income, or secondary education enrolment jointly with 
public debt ratio and old age dependency ratio, are used as explanatory variables, and 
whether or not these are complemented by the regional dummies, Armenia, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan, persistently show up as excessive spenders. All combinations of our proxies, 
for the level of social development (sec and mor), or economic of development (gdp), for Public Finances and Economic Transition 
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socio-cultural influences (eu and las), as well as for exogenous expenditure requirements 
(old and d),  fail to justify the high spending ratios in the first group.
14 
Other countries that appear as excessive spenders based on our regressions include 
Hungary, Mongolia and Kyrgyz Republic. Both Hungary and Mongolia progressed 
significantly on the front of economic reforms and liberalization, and clearly belong rather 
to the second than to the first group. The reasons for their deviation from the predicted 
values include heavy fixed capital formation financed by loans from multilateral 
organization in Mongolia
15 and relatively high transfers to households, such as pensions and 
sick and family allowances, and interest payments in Hungary. Kyrgyz Republic is an 
example from the fourth group - while the Kyrgyz general government has not spent more 
than 35 per cent of GDP due to the revenue shortage, the relatively small shares of the old 
population and of the required government interest payments, the low-quality results of 
government services (relatively low secondary education enrolment, but high infant 
mortality), and GDP per capita (based on purchasing power parity prices, PPP) of less than 
US$2,400 do not justify even this level. This result holds even if we “allow” the Kyrgyz 
Republic to share the European social democratic/Christian preferences and add the eu-
dummy premium. 
Countries that are spending less than most of the regression results would suggest, 
while having at least some access to credit, include Belarus, Bulgaria and Croatia. These 
three countries cope with a high old age dependence ratio, and seem to supply relatively 
good amount of government services in the social sectors. Bulgaria's picture is the trickiest 
of all.  Among all the transition countries, Bulgaria faces the highest share of elderly in 
                                                 
14 Belarus is an exception in the first group.  Having relatively high share of old population, very high secondary 
education enrolment, compared to most Eastern European countries quite a high GDP pro capita, and sharing the 
European historical preference for extensive social responsibility for all society members (hence, for a large-sized 
government), Belarus' actual general government expenditure was actually in all the instances slightly lower than the 
predicted value.  The rationale for including Belarus into the group 1, however, is quite strong, considering its 
excessive government interference with the markets, which include enterprise subsidies surpassing six per cent of GDP 
and resistance to privatize most of the state owned enterprises.  Similar arguments apply to Georgia and Ukraine, of 
which actual general government expenditures were usually only slightly above the predicted levels. 
15 In Mongolia, the total general government expenditure has declined from 67 per cent of GDP in 1988-89 to 43 
per cent of GDP during 1993-94 when, however, only about 26 per cent of GDP are predicted.  Current general 
government expenditure, however, count for less than 30% of GDP.  Almost 15% of GDP cover investment projects 
into public enterprises prior to their privatization, projects that are led by multilateral organizations due to the absence L. Barbone, H. Polackova 
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population and the heaviest public debt burden, requiring interest payments of about 11 per 
cent of GDP annually. Regression (3), therefore predicts that Bulgaria could spend more 
than it does. However, the (both current and PPP-based) national income per capita in 
Bulgaria, is low, about two thirds of that of Belarus or Croatia. And, regressions including 
per-capita GDP as an explanatory variable predict that Bulgaria (unlike Belarus and Croatia) 
should spend less than it actually does. Results of equation (1) suggest that Bulgaria's 
government spending is at about the right level, and thus, in sum, that its social 
development and pressures to spend are higher than what its stage of economic development 
would suggest. 
To sum up, we can use Figure 3 to draw broad generalizations as to the current 
spending patterns of the four groupings of countries we previously identified. Group 1, on 
the whole, appears to be spending considerably more than structural indicators would 
suggest, perhaps to the tune of some ten per cent of GDP. The choice for the policy-makers 
there is clear: economic reform must continue to be accompanied by a scaling down 
government. This policy option will be reinforced, as we will see, by the revenue 
considerations discussed in the next section. Group 2, on the other hand, appears not to 
have, on average, an excessive size of the state compared to other countries. In this sense, 
these countries can be thought of as having completed their transition to a mature state. 
There are however two relevant questions that need to be addressed by policy-makers there. 
First, whether the revenues exist that can continue to support these spending levels 
(abstracting from the issue of the effects of high levels of taxation on long-term growth). As 
we will see, serious questions can be raised in this respect. Secondly, whether the 
composition of expenditures, and, most importantly, the dynamics of individual programs 
are optimal for the countries involved and sustainable over the medium term. While this 
paper cannot answer these questions, there are ample indications that the answer might be 
negative on both counts. 
Group 3 provides an interesting perspective on what successful reform can accomplish 
in exceptional circumstances. Actual spending in these countries is, on average, more than 
ten percentage points of GDP lower than predicted. This implies that a considerable burden 
                                                                                                                                                      
of foreign direct investment.  Thus, it should be reminded here that the lower is the willingness of private sector to Public Finances and Economic Transition 
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has been eased off the private sector in terms of reduced need for extracting resources to pay 
for government programs. At the same time, it also implies that the burden on the regulatory 
and oversight role of the state becomes even stronger, as the provision of many public and 
merit goods, as well as of social protection, is shifted to the private sector. 
Finally, the data confirm that for Group 4 there is little scope for expanding the size of 
the government. To the extent that the current provision of public goods and services is 
unsatisfactory, an answer can be found only through speeded-up reform of programs, within 
the continued strictures of the existing budget constraints. 
Figure 3:  








































3. An Empirical Assessment of the Revenue Sustainability in 
RESEs 
The finding of the previous section, namely whether the RESEs' general governments 
spend larger shares of GDP than predicted, does not reflect the fact, how much government 
spending the countries can actually afford. This leads us the next questions we want to 
                                                                                                                                                      
invest in a country, the lower is the opportunity cost of taxes (Peacock (1961). L. Barbone, H. Polackova 
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address:  what is the current and future ability of governments to collect sufficient revenues 
to finance their spending. What is the ”capacity” of RESEs to generate tax revenues; and to 
what extent do the RESEs use this capacity currently? Obviously, these questions are also 
valid for countries that are relatively close to their predicted levels of government spending. 
In this section we develop an empirical model linking observed government revenues 
to structural indicators of the economies they pertain to. As in the previous section, a model 
fitted to a cross-section of non-RESE countries will be used to predict values of government 
revenues in RESEs. From the predicted and actual values, in accordance with the model 
developed by Chelliah, Baas and Kelly (1971 and 1975), we construct an index of tax effort. 
Defined as the actual revenue ratio divided by the predicted ratio, the index of tax effort 
indicates the future revenue potential in a country.
16 In broad terms, a high tax effort index 
should serve as a warning that the country's taxable capacities are overstretched. 
 
3.1. Determinants of Government Revenue 
Compared to the analysis of government expenditure, the literature has identified a 
relatively narrower number of determinants of government revenue.  Among the 
demographic factors, urbanization positively affects tax revenue (Lotz and Morss, 1967). 
On the other hand, population densities do not help explain the country differences in 
taxable capacities (Tait, Gratz and Eichengreen, 1979). Population size is considered 
significant as it affects openness (the share of foreign trade in production) and is inversely 
related to foreign trade shares in GDP (Hinrichs, 1966). 
The degree of economic openness appears to exert a significant economic influence on 
government revenue (Oshima, 1957, and Tanzi, 1992). Openness affects revenues directly, 
mainly in developing countries with high trade tariffs. (Of course, openness is losing its 
direct effect on revenue as countries liberalize their trade.) The degree of openness, 
however, does not affect revenues through actual tariff collection only; rather, in many 
countries, it indicates the relative importance of cash crops and subsistence agriculture, as 
                                                 
16 As Tanzi (1986 and 1988) showed the extent of the country's exploiting its taxable capacities also depends on 
its revenue needs, which are determined by the expenditure target and by the existing public debt. Public Finances and Economic Transition 
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well as the degree of urbanization and industrialization, and, thus, is associated with 
conditions that facilitate internal taxation. For example, the degree of openness of an 
economy may be an indicator of the elasticity of the tax system, as well as a measure of the 
technological sophistication of the economy (Lotz and Morss, 1967). 
Other economic measures of taxable capacity include aggregate GDP, national income 
per capita, the distribution of income, the industrial origin of output, and the composition of 
government expenditure. Again, per-capita GDP serves as a proxy for the level of economic 
development, which is usually accompanied by a higher rate of literacy, increased 
monetization, and stricter law enforcement - all of which help increase taxable capacity. 
With respect to the explanatory power of per-capita income, the past studies reached 
varying conclusions.
17 Compared to the previous studies, including Tanzi (1992), the 
regressions discussed below suggest that per capita GDP has been gaining significance in 
explaining actual government revenue - at the expense of openness. The sector composition 
of the economy (e.g., the share of agriculture, or mining), the extent of gray economy, the 
percentage of economic units exceeding a certain size limit and number of workers 
employed in such units, and the share of large retail establishments in the economy also 
affect the ease of tax collection (Heller and Diamond, 1990, and Tanzi, 1992). General 
economic factors, like prosperity and income distribution may also influence the tax system, 
the use of particular tax sources, the amount of tax exemptions, and, consequently, tax 
revenues (Heller and Diamond, 1990). 
Another group of revenue determinants relates to technological advances. Higher 
sophistication in tax collection, expanding the available set of effective tax sources, reduces 
the sacrifice undertaken to raise taxes. On the other hand, the combination of low wages for 
tax administrators, high tax rates, inefficient system of identifying tax evaders, and low 
                                                 
17  According to Tait, Gratz and Eichengreen (1979), per-capita income helps explain taxable capacities for 
countries with GDP $500 per capita and less.  Hindrichs (1966), on the other hand, argued that only contrasting of 
government revenue shares of GDP between developed and less developed countries suggests that gg revenue shares 
increase with economic development; whereas it proves to be misleading or plain wrong when observing differences 
among less developed countries only.  Compared to GDP per capita, he continued, openness of economy is a superior 
indicator of the government revenue shares for less developed countries (GDP per capita below $300); and for more 
developed countries, high GDP per capita is a sufficient though not necessary condition for higher revenue shares. 
Chelliah, Baas and Kelly (1975) and Tanzi (1992) agreed that regressions, which include the share of agriculture and/or 
mining in GDP in place of per capita income, display better goodness of fit. One reason for this may be that the share of L. Barbone, H. Polackova 
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penalties for tax evasion is not conducive to efficient tax collection (Peacock, 1969). 
Precisely this unfavorable combination is present in most transition countries. 
Social, political and administrative influences on government revenue are again very 
multifaceted and closely related to the determinants of the government expenditure. Social 
and political factors, such as attitude toward egalitarianism, allocative neutrality, fiscal 
centralization, the depth of democracy (civil society), and the influence of various interest 
groups, clearly predetermine the extent to which a government can exploit a potential tax 
base.
18  The attitude  of citizens toward the government, hence to taxes, may be influenced 
by religious and ideological tendencies, as well as by the quality of public services and by 
the efficiency with which tax revenues are spent. Moreover, lack of public confidence in 
government and the national economy may cause capital flight and currency substitution, 
which further restrict government revenue (Heller and Diamond, 1990). 
Also, war and crises seem to have a long-term tax effects:  People accept, in a period 
of war, or depression, tax levels and methods of raising revenue that in quieter times they 
would have thought intolerable, and this acceptance remains long after the disturbance itself 
has disappeared (Peacock and Wiseman, 1961, and Oshima, 1957). Since the beginning of 
the century, and even in absence of major crisis, for example, during 1960-85, government 
expenditure and taxes (as well as deficits and public debt) in OECD countries were steadily 
rising (Tanzi, 1986). It has proven difficult to quantify what is the tolerable level of taxation 
(Peacock and Wiseman, 1961), or even to argue that such a “tolerable maximum” exists. 
 
3.2. Empirical Results for Revenue Sustainability 
Based on the indications provided by the literature, we ran a number of regressions to 
predict country capacity to raise revenue. The model is estimated from 1993/94 general 
government revenue (gr) figures of the same 47 countries, and applied on the transition 
                                                                                                                                                      
agriculture in GDP affects not only taxable capacity but also the willingness to tax -- since taxing the agricultural sector 
is generally politically difficult.   
18  Peacock (1969), for example, suggested that the share of Christian population and years of national 
independence have a positive relationship with the tax ratio; and that, with respect to both the willingness to pay taxes 
and demand for government services, some index of political democracy or ideologies can be roughly constructed. Public Finances and Economic Transition 
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countries. Our selected regressions (Box 2) use PPP-based per capita GDP (gdp), share of 
manufacturing in GDP (mn), share of exports in GDP (x), and share of urban population 
(urb), as proxies for the capacity to collect revenue.
19 In addition, secondary education 
enrolment (sec) is to indicate the country constraint on the tax system sophistication. 
Regional dummies (eu and las) again proxy the historical-philosophical traditions, and so 
the public willingness to pay taxes. We also include the public debt (d) in per cent of GDP 
to represent an exogenous pressure on the government effort to expand revenue (Tanzi, 
1992). With respect to the literature above, we tested the explanatory power of several other 
variables, such as industry share in GDP, manufactures export share in GDP, gross domestic 
investment, gross domestic saving and previous year's government deficit, proxies for the 
country's access to credit (such as the depth of the domestic financial sector and Moody's 
current sovereign risk rating), different dummies for various country groups, and a war 
dummy. These variables, however, either proved less statistically significant, or appear as 
easily changing, and therefore misleading in indicating of the future sustainability of 
government finances. 
Similarly to the analysis of government expenditure, our selected regressions for 
government revenue can explain a satisfactory amount of the sample variance, and have 
most coefficients significant at the 5 per cent level and of the expected sign. Comparing 
revenue equation 3, in Box 2, with expenditure equation 2, in Box 1, and their comparators 
without the regional dummies, we see that GDP per capita has a greater explanatory power 
in illustrating government revenue; whereas the regional dummies play a greater role in 
explaining government expenditure. From this and further comparisons, we may boldly 
conclude that, although socio-political traditions are an important determinant of the role 
and expenditure of government, the ability of government to raise revenue is determined 
mainly by the development of economy, at least for the sample under consideration. For 
purposes of our following analysis of government revenue level and sustainability, we 
choose equation (4).  Its results are shown in Figures 4 and 5. 
 
                                                 
19 The past literature usually emphasized imports, rather than exports, as the direct source of potential revenues.  
As for the long-term revenues, however, exports predetermine the sustainable level of both imports and tariff revenues. L. Barbone, H. Polackova 
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  Box 2: Revenue Regression Summary 
All the following regressions apply to 47 countries and do not include any transition countries. 
The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
gr  =         Adj  R-sqrRoot  MSE
(1)  0.102 urb + 0.200 x  +12.88 eu - 10.30 las     +23.279     
 (2.42) (2.82) (4.98) (-4.49)      (7.30)  0.78  6.2 
Comparator without the regional dummies:   
  0.199 urb + 0.383 x           + 13.557     
  (2.67)  (3.11)       (2.57)  0.27  11.3 
(2)  0.429 gdp + 0.164 x  +0.087 sec  -0.355 mn+11.37 eu - 4.83 las  + 24.48     
 (1.92) (2.63) (1.65) (-2.10) (4.25) (-1.85)  (7.24)  0.84  5.4 
Comparators:  
  0.940 gdp + 0.221 x  +0.133 sec  -0.580 mn    + 20.64     
 (3.62) (2.64) (1.90) (-3.09)      (4.55)     
  Problem: Manufacturing has but should not have a negative coeficcient.     
  0.842 gdp + 0.221 x  +0.130 sec        + 11.18     
 (3.00) (2.43) (1.71)        (3.08)  0.63  8.1 
   1.23 gdp  + 0.241 x          + 15.67     
  (7.22)  (2.61)       (6.11)  0.61  8.2 
(3)  0.587 gdp +11.83 eu -  7.60 las       + 26.69     
 (3.49) (4.31) (-3.18)        (11.06) 0.78  6.2 
Comparator:  
    1.34  gdp       +  19.48    
  (7.66)        (8.66)  0.56  8.8 
(4)  0.824 gdp + 0.209 x  +0.118 sec  + 0.085 d     +  6.93     
 (3.08) (2.40) (1.62) (2.27)      (1.76)  0.66  7.7 
Notes:urb -  share of urban population       gdp -  per capita GDP evaluated at PPP 
  x- share of exports in GDP      mn - share of manufacturing in GDP 
  sec -  secondary education enrolment ratio d - public debt to GDP ratio 
  eu = 1 if country belongs to Europe;    las = 1 if country belongs to Latin America or Asia; 
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Figure 4: 


























The predicted revenue/GDP ratios based on the regressions discussed above show 
interesting patterns among the four groups (Table 3 and 4). The countries of Group 1 and 
Group 2, on average, display the highest tax effort compared to model predictions. There is 
some variation among individual countries, but the message is rather uniform.   
 In Group 1, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan raised double the amount of revenue than 
predicted; Ukraine and Belarus surpassed their predicted revenue level by one-half. Only 
Armenia and Georgia have theoretically a greater potential to raise revenue than the amount 
they actually have collected. 
In Group 2, Hungary and Poland collected 150 per cent of their predicted revenues. 
The (relatively) low predicted revenues for these two countries result, in part, from their 
relatively limited openness (with export share of only 18 per cent of GDP), which, 
theoretically, reduces their potential to raise revenues. Nonetheless, Hungary's high tax L. Barbone, H. Polackova 
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effort index mainly reflects the very high level of actual revenue (the highest among the 
transition countries, and fourth-ranking in the world, after Sweden, Denmark and 
Netherlands). The only country from group 2 that shows a tax effort index below 1 is 
Bulgaria, whose predicted revenue level is quite high - owing mainly to strong pressure on 
raising revenue, which is predicted from servicing its high level of public debt.  
Similarly to the previous groups, countries of Group 3 have also, on average, collected 
revenues that seem to surpass their revenue capacities. There is, however, a great variation 
among them. Latvia, Estonia and Romania appear overstretched; whereas Lithuania and 
Moldova, do not seem to exploit their taxable capacity fully. Finally, as was hinted to in the 
discussion of the financial constraints, countries in Group 4, apparently lacking the ability 
to collect revenue and utilize their taxable potential. 
Figure 5: 












































Comparison of predicted and actual revenues and the tax effort indices (the first 
column in Tables 3 and 4), however, tell only a part of the story. Armenia and Georgia 
show tax effort ratio below one, and are predicted to collect, respectively, 4 and 8 per cent 
of GDP more revenue than they actually do. But their actual revenues fail to cover their 
expenditure by, respectively, 40 and 33 per cent of GDP!   Public Finances and Economic Transition 
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   1  Armenia 0.82  21.1  17.2 42.6  57.8  -40.6  -21.5  -36.7 
 Tajikistan  2.02 18.9  38.2  23.0  54.2  -16.0  -4.1 -35.3 
 Ukraine  1.74 24.1  41.9  48.2  52.1  -10.2 -24.1 -28.0 
 Uzbekistan 2.08 20.3  42.2  24.3  49.0  -6.8  -4.0 -28.7 
 Azerbaijan 1.24 24.9  31.0  42.1  46.1  -15.1 -17.2 -21.2 
 Georgia  0.63 20.5  13.0  45.0  46.0  -33.0 -24.5 -25.5 
 Belarus  1.51 26.1  39.3  49.6  45.2  -5.9 -23.5 -19.1 
    2  Hungary 1.75  31.1  54.4 52.4  61.6  -7.2  -21.3  -30.5 
 Slovakia  1.33 37.2  49.3  50.8  54.6  -5.3 -13.6 -17.4 
 Czech  Rep 1.34 38.3  51.5  49.8  50.1  1.4 -11.5 -11.8 
 Poland  1.59 29.3  46.7  48.3  49.3  -2.6 -19.0 -20.0 
 Russia  1.28 26.3  33.7  47.4  48.1  -14.4 -21.1 -21.8 
 Slovenia  1.39 34.7  48.2  48.0  47.0  1.2 -13.3 -12.3 
 Macedonia 1.39 27.3  37.9  45.8  45.0  -7.1 -18.5 -17.7 
 Bulgaria  0.98 37.0  36.2  54.3  44.6  -8.4 -17.3  -7.6 
 Mongolia  1.15 24.5  28.1  25.9  43.1  -15.0  -1.4 -18.6 
 Albania  1.25 31.8  39.9  43.3  42.2  -2.3 -11.5 -10.4 
 Croatia  1.36 30.7  41.6  48.8  40.9  0.7 -18.1 -10.2 
   3  Estonia 1.35  27.7  37.5  47.0  38.4  -0.9  -19.3  -10.7 
 Latvia  1.49 24.3  36.3  46.8  37.0  -0.7 -22.5 -12.7 
 Romania  1.37 23.8  32.6  46.2  33.1  -0.5 -22.4  -9.3 
 Lithuania  0.92 28.9  26.5  46.1  31.3  -4.8 -17.2  -2.4 
 Moldova  0.80 22.9  18.3  44.4  26.5  -8.2 -21.5  -3.6 
   4  Kyrgyz Rep.  1.02  23.4  23.8  27.0  34.9  -11.1  -3.6  -11.5 
 Kazakhstan 0.76 25.7  19.5  26.3  18.8  0.7  -0.6  6.9 
  Turkmenistan  0.56 25.8  14.5  23.4  15.7  -1.2  2.4  10.1 
In order to evidence “long-term discrepancies”, we compare predicted revenue with 
actual expenditure (the last column in Tables 3 and 4). This approach, again, illustrates that 
such an implicit deficit is the largest, reaching 30 per cent of GDP, in countries of group 1 
and - in Hungary. The large gaps between the predicted revenues and actual expenditures 
suggest that, in the long term, unless there is a fast economic growth and “formalization” of L. Barbone, H. Polackova 
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gray economies, most countries of group 1 may fail to raise a sufficient amount of revenue 
to sustain their current expenditure heights. This conclusion is reinforced by the aging 
trends of the population, which are likely to result in increasing pressures on social security 
expenditures. The implicit deficit and potential for fiscal crisis applies to several countries 
of group 2 as well; the difference being only that the governments of these have so far easier 
access to credit. Countries of group 3 show levels of the implicit deficit similar to the 
OECD countries (about 8 per cent of GDP on average). Only group 4, except for the Kyrgyz 
Republic, which is the only country there with a high actual deficit, shows implicit 
surpluses, which are typical for middle-income developing countries. 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, as well as Lithuania, could be considered happy examples. 
They do not run excessive deficits and, yet, do not exhaust their revenue capacities above 
the predicted levels. However, these countries belong to the lowest spenders among the 
transition countries and, as we noted earlier, their governments have postponed spending on 
some of their current liabilities. Thus, they appear accumulating a hidden debt, to be repaid 
as soon as revenues recover. Moreover, if reforms and private initiatives are lacking in the 
social sectors, as is the case of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, a continuing financial 
constraint on government expenditure may annihilate their social security systems as well as 
pensioners. 
Table 4: Index of Tax Effort and Actual and Predicted Deficits, General Government, 1993-94. 




















OECD  1.03  44.0  45.3 50.4 50.8  -5.5 -6.4  -6.8 
OECD w/o 
U.S.& Japan 
1.07  43.9  46.8 52.1 52.6  -5.8 -8.2  -8.7 
Western  Europe  1.10  44.3  48.7 54.9 54.9  -6.2  -10.6  -10.5 
Transition  1  1.43  22.3  31.8  39.3  50.1  -18.2  -17.0  -27.8 
Transition  2  1.33  31.7  42.5 46.8 47.9  -5.4  -15.1  -16.2 
Transition  3  1.18  25.5  30.2 46.1 33.3  -3.0  -20.6  -7.7 
Transition  4  0.77  25.0  19.3 25.6 23.1  -3.9 -0.6  1.8 
Developing 
countries 
0.90  27.1  24.4 26.4 26.1  -1.7  0.7  1.0 Public Finances and Economic Transition 
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We can see another interesting “warning” when we consolidate our predictions for the 
expenditure and revenue, and analyze the predicted deficits (the second column from the 
right, in Tables 3 and 4). The largest predicted deficits surface not only for high spenders, 
such as Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus and Armenia from group 1, and Hungary and Russia 
from group 2, but also for the low-spending reformers, such as Latvia, Romania and 
Moldova from group 3. 
What does a large gap between the predicted revenue and predicted expenditure 
suggest? Our regressions have proven that factors of socio-political development play a 
greater role in determining government expenditure; whereas economic factors, and national 
income per capita in particular, are more important explanations of revenue collection. A 
large predicted deficit, or surplus, as it is in Turkmenistan and most developing countries, 
thus could be interpreted as the manifestation of a gap between the domestic social and 
economic development. These predicted deficits are relatively small for Mongolia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan demonstrate that their levels of 
economic and social development are rather consistent. But, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, and 
Ukraine, from group 1, Hungary and Russia from group 2, and Latvia and Romania from 
group 3, seem to provide a very large amount of social services relatively to the 
development of their national economies. In such cases of relative economic 
underdevelopment, to sustain the level of social development, government should involve 
the private sector into rationalizing and providing of social services sooner than these 
services will become plain words of  in-financable political promises. 
 
4.  Summary: Trouble Ahead? 
A few remarks by way of summary. The data and analysis presented in the previous 
pages point to a multifaceted picture with regard to the evolution of public finances in 
RESEs, in the five or so years, since economic transformation began. The main common 
message is, perhaps, that the combination of success in the pursuit of economic reform and 
in dealing with the derived social pressures is the main determinant of the probability that a 
country will drift towards a high-spending government pattern. Of the four groups that we 
have identified, it would appear that sharpest choices will have to be made by countries of L. Barbone, H. Polackova 
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group 1. Their economic realities may soon prevent the government from sustaining its 
existing services. A similar situation occurred at the beginning of transition in countries of 
group 3 and 4. In order to escape the future trap expanding public expenditure, group 4 will 
have to use the current financial constraint as a politically feasible reason for rationalizing 
and marketizing the social sectors. Due to such policy reforms, group 3 shows a good 
promise to escape a high spending pattern. 
The analysis of revenue performance, in conjunction with the indications provided by 
the expenditure analysis, gives pause for thought, particularly for the countries in group 2. 
There, government spending is high, but spending patterns might be difficult to alter as this 
would require a fundamental reform of social security expenditures. Some of these 
countries, particularly the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, where 
governments enjoy a relatively good access to credit, may be considered as surely 
converging towards the Western European expenditure levels. But, even in these countries, 
the transition towards a sustainable public finance system is not completed at all. As the 
regression data suggest, most of the group 2 countries are likely to face a pressure on 
revenues. This pressure may be increasing also with the rising share of the private sector 
share in GDP, when compliance with high taxation becomes more problematic. But beyond 
paying increasing attention to tax administration reform, the message for these countries is 
similar to the message for the rest of the transition world: A serious reform of social 
expenditure is inescapable. Public Finances and Economic Transition 
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